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JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction for this appeal is conferred upon this Court 
by Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Is a release from liability and release of claims 
contract, which is read, understood and signed by both parties, a 
valid and enforceable agreement. Inasmuch as a challenge to 
summary judgment presents for review conclusions of law only, 
because, by definition, summary judgments do not resolve factual 
issues, the appellate court reviews those conclusions for correct-
ness, without according difference to the trial court's legal 
conclusion. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989). 
2. Was the trial court's decision to deny appellant's Motion 
to Amend Complaint an abuse of its discretion. A ruling on a 
motion to amend is within the sound discretion of the trial court. 
Absent a clear abuse of that discretion, the appellate court will 
not disturb a trial court's ruling on a motion to amend. Kelly v. 
Utah Power & Light, 746 P.2d 1189, 1190 (Utah App. 1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a medical malpractice action arising from a right 
total knee replacement performed by defendant R. David Beck, M.D. 
("Dr. Beck"), with defendant Bruce Hultgren, M.D. ("Dr. Hultgren") 
serving as the anesthesiologist, at defendant Holy Cross Hospital 
("the Hospital") on May 5, 1987. 
Defendant Dr. Hultgren filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
with the trial court claiming that plaintiff's claim against him 
was barred by the two year statute of limitations provided in Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-14-4, and that plaintiff failed to comply with 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-12(2). (R. at 95). The trial court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Hultgren on February 20, 
1991. The court found as a matter of law that plaintiff's claims 
against Dr. Hultgren were barred by the statute of limitations and 
that plaintiff's request for prelitigation review against Dr. 
Hultgren was procedurally deficient in that it was not served 
within sixty days after the notice of intent to commence action as 
required by Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-12(2). (R. at 309-310). 
Defendants Dr. Beck and Holy Cross Hospital filed Motions for 
Summary Judgment based on a valid and enforceable Release from 
Liability and Release of All Claims contract ("Release") entered 
into between plaintiff, Dr. Beck and the Hospital. (R. at 109 & 
153). The agreement released Dr. Beck and the Hospital from any 
and all liability for the knee surgery performed on May 5, 1987, 
in exchange for fair and adequate consideration. The trial court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Beck and the Hospital on 
March 4, 1991, finding as a matter of law that the agreement was 
valid and enforceable and released Dr. Beck and the Hospital from 
any and all liability. (R. at 315-318). 
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Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend his Complaint on November 
12, 1990, which was denied by the trial court in a separate order 
on March 4, 1991. (R. at 215-217, 313-314). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about May 5, 1987, plaintiff was admitted to Holy 
Cross Hospital for a right total knee replacement. (R. at 116). 
2. The operation was successfully performed by Dr. Beck, 
with Dr. Hultgren serving as the anesthesiologist. (R. at 116). 
3. During the post-surgery hospitalization plaintiff was on 
prolonged bed rest. (R. at 116). 
4. At some time following the surgery plaintiff complained 
of tingling and numbness in both arms, which was diagnosed as 
bilateral ulnar nerve compression. (R. at 116). 
5. Decompression surgery on both arms was recommended by 
Dr. Beck for this condition. (R. at 116). 
6. Plaintiff decided that the physicians and the Hospital 
were responsible for this condition but iiiiormed Dr. Beck that he 
would not sue him, or the Hospital, if Dr. Beck would perform the 
decompression surgery free of charge. (Deposition of Eugene 
Andreini, Attached as Exhibit 1, pp. 55-56, R. at 116 & 134). 
7. Although Dr. Beck believed that the ulnar nerve compres-
sion was due to plaintiff's arthritic condition, Dr. Beck agreed 
to perform the surgery without charge. (R. at 116). 
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8. As part of the agreement, Dr. Beck submitted a request 
to the Hospital asking them to also donate their services for the 
decompression surgery. (R. at 116). 
9. The Hospital agreed not to charge plaintiff for his 
hospitalization. (R. at 117). 
10. Plaintiff arrived for surgery and admission to the 
Hospital on July 9, 1987. (R. at 117). 
11. At this time, plaintiff was presented with a "Release 
from Liability and Release of all Claims" form which had been 
prepared by the Hospital. (Attached as Exhibit 2, R. at 117 & 
140. ) 
12. This form was to be signed by plaintiff before surgery 
would proceed and it released the Hospital and Dr. Beck from any 
and all liability for the knee surgery of May 5, 1987, in exchange 
for fair and adequate consideration. (R. at 117). 
13. Plaintiff initially refused to sign the Release. 
However, after a phone conversation with Dr. Beck, plaintiff signed 
the Release and the surgery went ahead as planned. (Andreini 
Deposition, pp. 53-54; R. at 117, 132-133). 
14. Plaintiff asserts that he was angry about having to sign 
the Release but acknowledges reading and signing it in the presence 
of his mother and a friend. (Andreini Deposition, pp. 52, 54, 58; 
R. at 117, 131, 133, 136). 
15. Plaintiff admitted in his deposition that he was not on 
medication when he read the Release, that he discussed signing the 
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Release with his mother and a friend, and that he could have gotten 
up and left the Hospital rather than have the surgery. (Andreini 
Deposition, pp. 52-54, 58-59; R. at 117, 131-133, 136-137). 
16. Plaintiff also admits that he knew what was in the 
Release, realized that Holy Cross was going to waive their charges 
in return for the Release, and that by signing the Release he was 
releasing Dr. Beck and the Hospital from liability. (Andreini 
Deposition, pp. 50, 56-58? R. at 118, 130, 134-136). 
17. After the Hospital provided their part of the agreement, 
free services for the decompression surgery, plaintiff breached his 
part of the contract by pursuing legal action against the Hospital. 
(Andreini Deposition, p. 64; R. at 118, 138). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
The trial court's Order granting summary judgment in favor of 
defendant Holy Cross Hospital was proper and should be affirmed 
because the Release from Liability and Release of All Claims 
("Release") signed by plaintiff was a valid and enforceable 
contract barring plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff read, understood 
and signed the Release. Plaintiff also admits that he could have 
got up and left the Hospital rather than have the surgery; and that 
he could have gone home and tried to find another doctor and 
another hospital to perform the surgery. 
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A release can be avoided only if the evidence of invalidity 
is clear and convincing. To invalidate a contract, a party thereto 
must show (1) that the other contracting party committed a wrongful 
act (2) which put the initial party in fear (3) such as to compel 
him to act against his will. There is absolutely no evidence in 
the record that the Hospital committed a wrongful act which put 
plaintiff in fear and compelled him to act against his will. To 
constitute legal duress, plaintiff must have acted against his 
will, and have had no other viable alternative. In this instance, 
there is no evidence that plaintiff was under duress when he signed 
the Release. Plaintifffs own deposition testimony establishes that 
not only did he not act against his will but that he also had other 
viable alternatives; leaving the hospital and finding another 
doctor and hospital. 
The law favors the good faith settlement of claims and the 
policy of this Court favors agreements such as this Release in 
resolving disputes. The trial court's decision that, as a matter 
of law, the Release was not signed under duress and is a valid and 
enforceable agreement barring plaintiff's claims was appropriate. 
POINT II 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
plaintiff's Motion to Amend his Complaint. Whether to grant leave 
to amend is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Absent 
a clear abuse of that discretion, the appellate court will not 
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disturb a trial court's ruling on a motion to amend. There is no 
evidence in the record that the trial court abused its discretion 
in this instance. Although the basis for the trial court's denial 
of appellant's Motion to Amend is unclear, courts may exercise 
their discretion and deny leave to amend where there is no evidence 
in the record supporting the new theory sought to be added by the 
plaintiff. Since there is absolutely no evidence of fraud in this 
case, it was clearly within the trial court's discretion to deny 
plaintiff leave to amend. Allowing plaintiff to add a claim based 
on such a theory would have served no purpose. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT HOLY CROSS 
HOSPITAL WAS PROPER AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
BECAUSE THE RELEASE FROM LIABILITY AND RELEASE 
OF ALL CLAIMS SIGNED BY PLAINTIFF WAS A VALID 
AND ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT BARRING PLAINTIFF'S 
CLAIMS. 
The sole issue for review on appeal is the correctness of the 
trial court's finding that the Release from Liability and Release 
of All Claims signed by plaintiff was a valid and enforceable 
contract. In reaching their decision, the trial court entered the 
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (See R at 315-
318): 
FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. That on or about May 5, 1987 R. David Beck, 
M.D., an orthopedic surgeon operated on the right knee 
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of the plaintiff. In this operation, which was performed 
at Holy Cross Hospital, Dr. Bruce Hultgren acted as 
anesthesiologist. 
2. In the days following the surgery on plain-
tiff's knee plaintiff noticed a tingling sensation in his 
fingers. 
3. Following plaintiff's discharge from Holy Cross 
Hospital, the plaintiff was diagnosed as having a 
compression paralysis. 
4. That subsequent to Dr. Nord's diagnosis, Dr. 
Beck recommended surgery which was scheduled for July 9, 
1987. 
5. That shortly prior to the surgery the plaintiff 
was presented with a release by Clara Bates, an employee 
of Holy Cross Hospital. 
6. That plaintiff told Clara Bates that he would 
not sign the release. 
7. That Dr. Beck then spoke with the plaintiff. 
8*. At that point in time, there was no reason why 
plaintiff could not have left the hospital in the company 
of his mother and Sarah McCarthy who had brought him to 
the hospital. 
9. That prior to signing the release plaintiff 
discussed the release with his mother and Sarah McCarthy. 
10. That plaintiff signed the release, the language 
of which is as follows: 
"I, EUGENE R. ANDREINI, will receive surgery 
to correct ulnar nerve palsy at approximately 
10:00 a.m., July 9, 1987, with Holy Cross 
Hospital of Salt Lake City, Utah and David 
Beck, M.D., bearing all costs for this 
procedure as payment of service. 
I recognize this arrangement, made to me, as 
total compensation for the alleged accidental 
incident occurring during total knee joint 
replacement on May 5, 1987, does not con-
stitute an acknowledgement of responsibility 
by Holy Cross Hospital of Salt Lake City for 
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said accidental incident, and do hereby 
release, acquit, and forswear any claim, by me 
or on my behalf, against Holy Cross Hospital 
of Salt Lake City, and David Beck, M.D. for 
liability and damages which have occurred or 
may occur arising from said accidental 
incident." 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the plaintiff at the time he signed the 
Release was not on any medication nor was he in a life-
threatening situation. 
2. That valid consideration was given by Holy 
Cross Hospital and Dr. Beck for the release and that this 
consideration was the free surgical procedure offered by 
Dr. Beck and the free hospital care offered by Holy Cross 
Hospital which was accepted by plaintiff. 
3. That at the time of the signing of the release 
the plaintiff was not operating under any duress, 
collusion, intimidation or undue influence by either 
Dr. Beck or personnel at the Holy Cross Hospital. 
4. That the plaintiff at the time of signing the 
release had reasonable alternatives and elected not to 
take them. 
5. That the release executed by the plaintiff on 
July 9, 1987 released any of plaintiff's claims that he 
may have then had or thereafter had against Dr. Beck, 
the Holy Cross Hospital and its personnel. 
Thus, the trial court's conclusions that plaintiff was not on 
medication nor in a life threatening situation at the time he 
signed the Release; that valid consideration was given for the 
Release; that plaintiff was not operating under any duress, 
collusion, intimidation or undi le Influence by either Dr. Beck or 
personnel at Holy Cross Hospital; that plaintiff had reasonable 
alternatives at the time of the signing of the Release and elected 
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not to take them; and, that the Release executed by plaintiff on 
July 9, 1987 released any of plaintiff's claims that he had against 
Dr. Beck and Holy Cross Hospital, must be reviewed for correctness. 
Plaintiff's primary challenge to the trial court's decision, 
and to the validity of the Release, is based on the grounds that 
it was signed under duress. It is unclear from plaintiff's brief 
exactly what acts were committed by personnel from the Hospital 
which constituted duress. However, it is clear from the above 
findings that the trial court considered this issue and found that 
there was no duress, collusion, intimidation or undue influence by 
hospital personnel. 
In Ulibarri v. Christenson, 2 Utah 2d 367, 275 P.2d 170 (Utah 
1954), the Utah Supreme Court established the burden of proof 
required to invalidate a release: 
. . . A release can be avoided only if the evidence of 
invalidity is clear and convincing, or, as has sometimes 
be said by this court, clear, unequivocal and convincing. 
(Citations omitted). 
Id. at 171. 
Thus, the trial court found in this instance that there was not 
clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence of duress, collusion, 
intimidation or undue influence on the part of hospital personnel. 
When reviewing plaintiff's own deposition, it is clear why 
the trial court reached the conclusion it did that plaintiff was 
not operating under duress at the time of the signing of the 
Release. (Pertinent excerpts of the Deposition of Eugene Andreini, 
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attached as Exhibit 1, R at 129-138). Plaintiff admitted in his 
deposition that he read and understood f he Release, and signed it 
in the presence of his mother and a friend. (Andreini Deposition, 
pp. 50, 52, 54, 56-58; R. at 129-138). Plaintiff also admitted 
that he was not on medicati oi i wl ien. 1 le read the Release, that he 
discussed signing the Release with his mother and a friend, and 
that he could have gotten up and left the hospital rather than have 
the surgery. (Andreini Deposition, pp. 52-54, 58-59; R. at 131-
133, 136-137). Plaintiff went on to further admit that he could 
have gone home and attempted to find another doctor and another 
hospital to perform the surgery. (Andre,ni Deposition, pp. 58-
59; R. at 136-137). Finally, plaintiff admits that he knew what 
was in the Release, realized that t he Hospital was going to waive 
their charges in return for the Release, and that by signing the 
Release he was releasing Dr. Beck and the Hospital from liability. 
(Andreini Deposition, pp. 50, 56-58; R. at 130, 134-136). Based 
on plaintiff's own testimony, the trial court correctly found that 
there was not clear and convincing evidence of duress and that 
plaintiff had other viable alternatives of which he was aware. 
This Court addressed a similar fact situation in Horqan v. 
Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751 (Utah 19 82). In Horqan, the 
court addressed the validity of a release of claims contract where 
the only challenge to the release was a claim of duress. 
Horqan involved a situation where a former employee brought 
an action against his former employer seeking to recover additional 
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compensation following his termination. At the time of his 
termination, the employee was given a compensation package. Both 
parties then signed a mutual release waiving all claims against the 
other and releasing each other from all obligations and liabilities 
arising out of the employment relationship. The defendants raised 
the mutual release as a defense and plaintiff responded that the 
release was unenforceable because he had signed it under duress and 
coercion. Defendants moved for summary judgment based on the 
release and the trial court granted defendants' motion. 
On appeal, this Court addressed the definition of a release 
and the court's policy towards this form of contract: 
A release is a type of contract and may generally be 
enforced or rescinded on the same grounds as other con-
tracts. The law favors the amicable, good faith settle-
ment of claims, and the encouragement and preservation 
of such settlements 'constitute strong arguments for 
enforcing releases.' Generally, 'where an affirmative 
defense is stated, such as a valid release, which would 
defeat the cause of action, it is the duty of the court 
to grant a judgment based thereon.' (Citations omitted). 
Id. at 753. 
In further reviewing the facts, the court agreed with 
plaintiff's assertion that there were genuine issues of fact, but 
held the following: 
. . . The mere existence of genuine issues of fact in 
the case as a whole does not preclude the entry of 
summary judgment if those issues are immaterial to 
resolution of the case. (Citation omitted). 
Id. at 752. 
The court went on to add: 
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The only material facts at this point concern the signing 
and terms of the mutual release; for if the release is 
valid and enforceable, plaintiff is precluded by its 
terms from asserting further claims against defendant. 
The only questions before us, then, are (1) whether there 
is a genuine issue concerning the signing or terms of the 
mutual release; and if not, (2) whether that release 
entitles defendants to a judgment as a matter of law. 
(Citations omitted). 
Id. at 752. 
After a brief review of the record, the court determined that 
the facts surrounding the signing and terms of the release were 
undisputed. The only remaining issue for them to address was the 
question whether plaintiff signed the release under duress. The 
question of what facts are sufficient to constitute duress was held 
by the court to be a question of law. Id. at 753. 
Citing Fox v. Piercey, 119 Utah 367, 227 P.2d 763, 766 (Utah 
1951), the court defined duress as follows: 
". . . Any wrongful act or threat which actually puts 
the victim in such fear as to compel him to act against 
his will." 
Id. at 753. 
Thus, to invalidate a contract based on duress, a party 
thereto must show (1) that the other contracting party committed 
a wrongful act (2) which put the initial party in fear (3) such as 
to compel him to act against his will. Heqlar Ranch, Inc. v. 
Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980). Thus, even if there 
were a wrongful act by the hospital in this instance, which there 
wasn't, and it put plaintiff in fear, which his own deposition 
testimony refutes, it must have also compelled him to act against 
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his will. There was no evidence presented to the trial court, or 
in plaintiff's brief, that plaintiff acted against his will when 
he signed the Release. 
The court in Horqan held that plaintiff did not sign the 
release under duress and the release was valid and enforceable. 
Thus, the plaintiff's suit was barred by the release and the trial 
court's entry of summary judgment for defendants was affirmed. 
In this instance, plaintiff admits reading, signing, and 
understanding the release. (See Andreini Deposition, R. at 129-
138). Thus, the only issue to be resolved is whether he did so 
under duress. The question then faced by the trial court was 
whether the Hospital committed a wrongful act which put plaintiff 
in fear such as to compel or coerce him to act against his will. 
Horqan, 657 P.2d at 753. There is absolutely no evidence in the 
record establishing these elements. To constitute legal duress, 
plaintiff must have acted against his will, and have had no other 
viable alternative. Id. at 754. This scenario was wholly 
unsupported by the facts in evidence before the trial court. As 
previously stated, plaintiff admitted that could have got up and 
left the hospital rather then have the surgery. (Andreini 
Deposition, pp. 53-54; R. at 132-133). Plaintiff also admitted 
that he could have gone home and tried to find another doctor and 
another hospital to perform the surgery. (Andreini Deposition, pp. 
58-59; R. at 136-137). Thus, plaintiff had other viable alterna-
tives and was admittedly not acting against his will. 
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Plaintiff argues in his brief that there was doubt in the 
trial court as to the question of duress, which should have been 
resolved in his favor. However, although there may have been doubt 
in plaintiff's mind, it Is clear from the trial court's findings 
that there was no doubt in the courts mind as to the question of 
duress. The question of what facts are sufficient to constitute 
duress is a question of law. Horgan, 657 P.2d at 753. Since there 
was no doubt as to this issue, the court did not have to reach the 
question of resolving the issue in favor ui plaintiff and found as 
a matter of law that there was no duress. 
Plaintiff also argues in his brief that he was induced i i 1 to 
executing the Release uncle i i)i Beck's threat of "no surgery," and 
that a threat of this nature constitutes a showing of duress suffi-
cient to invalidate the Release. Since 1 he Hospital was merely 
provide IK) hospital services and personnel to assist with the 
surgery, it is difficult to see how this claim can be made against 
the Hospital. However, it is not even necessary to reach this 
because appellant's plain deposition testimony refutes this alle-
gation. Appellant admitted that he could have gone home and found 
another hospital and another doctor to perform the surgery. 
(Andreini Deposition, pp. 58-59; R. at 136-137). Further, the Utah 
Supreme Court has held that emotional distress is not the equiva-
lent of duress and is inadequate to invalidate a release. Horgan, 
657 P.2d at 753, citing Ulibarri v. Christenson, 275 P.2d at 172. 
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Plaintiff relies in his brief on the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts §§ 175 and 176, to support his argument that he signed 
the release under duress. He alleges that § 175 was violated 
because the hospital made a threat which breached a duty of good 
faith and fair dealing. Not only is this assertion unsupported by 
any facts, but it applies to a situation where there is a contract 
in place. Since plaintiff argues that the threat took place prior 
to his signing of the release, and therefore prior to any contrac-
tual relationship, this section would not apply even it there were 
facts supporting it. 
Plaintiff also relies on §§ 175 and 176 in support of the 
argument that he had no reasonable alternative but to sign the 
release. However, plaintiff admits in his deposition that he did 
have the alternative of leaving the hospital, and the trial court 
clearly found as a matter of law that plaintiff had reasonable 
alternatives and elected not to take them. (Andreini deposition, 
pp. 53-54; R. at 132-133). 
Finally, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in 
weighing the credibility of a conflicting affidavit and deposition 
testimony. Although plaintiff does not specify whose affidavit and 
deposition he is referring to, the hospital will assume he is 
referring to his own. Yet, it is not clear to the Hospital that 
plaintiff's affidavit does contradict his deposition testimony. 
Even if it did, however, it would have no effect on the trial 
court's ruling. The general rule in Utah is that an affiant may 
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not "raise an issue of fact by his own affidavit which contradicts 
his deposition, unless he can provide an explanation of the 
discrepancy." Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130, 1140 (Utah App. 1990) 
(citation omitted). 
At the end of this Court's opinion in Horgan, the following 
observation was made which appears particularly relevant in this 
instance: 
. . . It is well settled that the mere fact of an 
improvident or bad bargain or a feeling of latent 
discontent is not a sufficient basis to avoid the effect 
of an otherwise va3id release. (Citations Omitted). 
Id. at 754. 
This Court also espoused sentiment for enforcing 
contracts such as the Release involved in this situation in Lindon 
City v. Engineers Construction Co., 636 P.2d 1070 (Utah 19811. 
Although Lindon involved a dispute of the enforcement of an 
arbitration agreement, the Court's logic would appear to apply to 
the present situation as well. The Court stated the following: 
There appears to be no 'public policy1 or other good 
reason why persons effectively and by contract, should 
not be able to agree to an out of court settlement. It 
is accomplished frequently by stipulation, binding 
concessions, accord and satisfaction, covenant not to 
sue, by indemnity contract, and by other honorable and 
legal means. 
The trend toward such inter se agreements without resort 
to litigation, reflects a good, practical way to resolve 
disputes. 
Id. at 1073. 
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The Release signed in this instance was intended to achieve the 
same result. 
It is appellant's burden factually to establish a prima facie 
showing for each element of his claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
477 U.S. 317, 322-27 (1986); Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, 
Inc., 740 P.2d 262, 264 (Utah App. 1987). There is absolutely no 
evidence that plaintiff signed the Release against his will. 
Plaintiff has also failed to demonstrate how the Hospital's conduct 
was wrongful or put him in fear. After reviewing the evidence in 
this case, the trial court found as a matter of law (1) that the 
Release signed was valid and enforceable and, (2) that plaintiff 
did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that he signed 
the Release under duress. Based on the evidence presented, the 
trial court's granting of summary judgment was appropriate and 
should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO AMEND 
COMPLAINT. 
On November 12, 1990, plaintiff filed a motion in the trial 
court to amend his Complaint. In essence, plaintiff sought to add 
a claim that Dr. Beck and Holy Cross Hospital misrepresented facts 
to him in order to induce him to sign the aforementioned Release 
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of Claims.1 (R. at 215-217). This motion was heard by the trial 
court on February 1, 1991, and denied in its March 4, 1991 Order. 
(R. at 313-314) . 
Whether to grant leave to amend is within the sound discretion 
of the trial court. Westlev v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 663 
P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983). Absent a clear abuse of that discretion, 
the appellate court will not disturb a trial court's ruling on a 
motion to amend. Kelly v. Utah Power & Light, 746 P.2d 1189, 1190 
(Utah App. 1987). Plaintiff's brief sets forth absolutely no 
evidence that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his 
Motion to Amend. Instead, plaintiff merely alleges some of the 
factors a trial court must consider when addressing a motion to 
amend. Although appellant is correct in his assertion that 
prejudice to the defendant is an important factor to consider when 
addressing a motion to amend, it is only one of several considera-
tions to be taken into account by the trial judge. 
The elements necessary to establish a claim of fraud are (1) 
a false representation of an existing material fact, (2) made 
knowingly or recklessly for the purpose of inducing reliance 
thereon, (3) upon which the plaintiff reasonably relies to his 
detriment. Atkinson v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 798 P.2d 733, 737 
1
 In his Motion to Amend Complaint, plaintiff failed to allege 
facts establishing how Holy Cross Hospital took part in this 
alleged fraud. Despite the fact that this proposed amendment does 
not state a claim against Holy Cross Hospital, the hospital will 
respond above to the merits of plaintiff's argument. 
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(Utah 1990). The trial court's March 4, 1991 Order denying 
appellant's Motion to Amend Complaint does not specify the 
reasoning behind the court's decision. (The court does refer to the 
fact that it had already granted summary judgment in favor of all 
defendants). (R. at 313-314). However, courts may exercise their 
discretion and deny leave to amend where the evidence does not 
support the plaintiff's claims. Since there is absolutely no 
evidence of fraud in this instance, it was within the trial court's 
discretion to deny plaintiff leave to amend. 
In Trimble v. Coleman Co., 437 P.2d 219, 227 (Kan. 1968), the 
trial court denied plaintiff's motion to amend the pleadings to 
include the theories of res ipsa loquitur and breach of implied 
warranty of fitness. Trimble involved a negligence action for 
deaths due to carbon monoxide poisoning against the seller and 
manufacturer of a gas heating stove. On appeal, the Kansas Supreme 
Court affirmed the trial court's decision denying leave to amend 
and stated "we do not believe that either of these doctrines was 
applicable to the facts in evidence in this case." With regard to 
the claim for breach of implied warranty of fitness, the court's 
decision to affirm the trial court's daniel of leave to amend was 
based on the fact that the plaintiff could not show evidence for 
one of the elements of the claim; that the product was defective 
as of the time it left the possession and control of the parties 
sought to be held liable. Id. at 227. 
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The Arizona Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in 
Ornelas v. Fry, 727 P.2d 819 (Ariz. App. 1986). Ornelas involved 
a medical malpractice claim against an anesthesiologist for damages 
incurred in a failed kidney transplant operation. The plaintiff 
moved to amend the complaint in order to present a new claim of 
negligence or theory of recovery based on the doctor's alleged 
alcoholism. The trial court denied the motion, holding that no 
evidence of the doctor's general "alcoholism" would be admitted 
without a factor predicate from a witness that the doctor's 
abilities in the operation room at the time of the operation were 
some way affected. Id. at 822. The Arizona Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial court's decision to deny the motion to amend. 
Its ruling was based on plaintiff's inability to furnish any 
evidence that at the time of the alleged malpractice the doctor's 
performance was in any way impaired because of the use of alcohol. 
As mentioned, the basis for the trial court's denial of 
appellant's Motion to Amend is unclear in this instance. However, 
the above cases illustrate the discretion of trial courts to deny 
a motion to amend when there is no evidence in the record support-
ing the new theory sought to be added by the plaintiff. It was 
within the trial court's discretion to recognize that granting 
appellant's Motion to Amend would serve no purpose but to increase 
time and expense since the fraud claim could not be established as 
a matter of law. See also Dupler v. Yates, 351 P.2d 624, 637 (Utah 
1960) (wherein the Utah Supreme Court found that the trial court 
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did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to amend where 
nothing new or of substance was contained in the proposed amend-
ment.) Regardless of the trial court's reasoning behind their 
decision to deny leave to amend, there is no evidence that the 
court abused its discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments and authorities, the trial 
court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of defendant 
Holy Cross Hospital, and its decision denying plaintiff's Motion 
to Amend Complaint, should be affirmed. 
The trial court's decision that the Release of Claims and 
Release from Liability signed by plaintiff was not signed under 
duress, and was a valid and enforceable agreement which barred 
plaintiff's claims against the Hospital, was appropriate and should 
be affirmed. 
Further, the trial court's decision to deny plaintiff's Motion 
to Amend was within its sound discretion and was not an abuse of 
that discretion. 
DATED this f^j day of September, 1991. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
David W. Slagle """ r J 1 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Holy Cross Hospital 
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, a Certified 
Reporter and 
thing like this, you know, where it looked like it might 
be somebody's fault. And he said that he would talk to 
the hospital for me. And so — and I hadn 
him since, so I didn't know. 
Q. 
't talked to 
So you discussed with Dr. Beck that the hospital 
might waive its fee? 
A. 
behalf. 
Q. 
was she? 
A. 
mine. I 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. He was going to talk to the hospital in my 
This lady that you talked to at McKay-Dee, who 
She was just an acquaintance of a 
don't even know her name. 
Who was the friend that knows her" 
His name is Ted. 
friend of 
p 
Who was that? What's his last name? 
I could find out, I guess. 
Okay. 
If it's important. 
This nurse at McKay-Dee said that 
the hospital might waive its fee? 
A. 
Q. 
subject 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And then you called Dr. Beck and ) 
with him? 
Right. 
He said he'd talk to the hospital 
quite possibly 
oroached that 
about it? 
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A. 
Q. 
marked 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
No. 
[Deposition Exhibit 1 marked 
for identification.] 
(By Mr. Fishier) I'll show you what's been 
as Exhibit 1. Can you identify that document? 
Yes. 
And what is it? 
It's the release that I signed the morning of 
the surgery. 
Q. Mentions here that this surgery was to commence 
at approximately 10:00 a.m.; is that correct? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
I'm not sure. 
About what time did you sign the release? 
Probably a half-hour, 4 5 minutes, maybe, before 
the surgery. Possibly an hour. 
Q. When this lady brought the release in, were you 
alone in the room? 
A. 
the two 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
medicat 
A. 
Q. 
No. My mother was there and Sarah McCarthy, and 
nurses. 
Did you read the release? 
Yes. 
At that point in time, had you received any 
ion? 
I'm not sure. 
Did you discuss this release with your mother 
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1 and Sarah? 
2 A. I told — Clara Bates, I guess is who she was, 
3 now that I see her name on there — that I wasn't going 
4 to sign it. So she got Dr. Beck on the phone. 
5 Q. And what did Dr. Beck say? 
6 A. He told me that if I wanted to have the surgery, 
7 I had to sign the release; and if I didn't sign the 
8 release, he was going to play hardball with me. Those 
9 were his exact words. 
10 Q. What did you take that to mean? 
11 A. That he was just going to let me figure out how 
22 to take care of my hands myself, I guess. 
IS Q. You knew there were other orthopedists in the 
14 city, didn't you? 
15 A. I guess so. 
16 Q- Okay. Is there any reason why you couldn't have 
11 just gotten up out of the bed, put your clothes back on 
lg and walked out? 
19 A. Other than the fact that I was extremely upset 
20 and just had the surgery two months before and I was on 
2i crutches and upset and my hands had deteriorated 'til I 
22 looked like a skeleton. 
23 Q. That's not — listen to my question. Had you 
24 wanted to at the time, you could have asked your mother 
25 and Sarah to take you from the hospital room and you 
1 could have left the hospital? 
2 A* Probably so. 
3 Q. Who took you to the hospital? 
4 A, My mother and Sarah. 
5
 Q. And they were still there? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q* Did anyone else hear what was said on the 
8
 telephone by Dr. Beck? 
9 A. I don't believe so. They couldn't hear on my 
10 end. They just knew how upset I was. 
U Q. Did you tell them what Beck said? 
12 A. Yeah. 
13 Q. So rather than have Sarah and your mother take 
14
 you back when she would come, you decided to sign the 
15 release? 
16 A. Yes. 
17
 Q. Did you discuss signing the release with your 
18 mother or Sarah? 
19 A. Yes. 
20
 Q. Tell me what you said to them and they said to 
21 you. 
22 A. I said according to Dr. Beck's conversation with 
23 me on the phone right before we made the appointment, you 
24 know, two or three days before, he indicated to me that 
25 in most cases after two or three weeks after the 
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operation I would gain 50 percent of my feeling or 
mobility — or whatever you want to call it — back in my 
hands, and probably the other 50 percent within two to 
three months. So I was under the impression that the 
surgery would correct it, and that's why I wanted the 
surgery done as soon as possible- It looked like it had 
dragged on for quite a while- Anyway, you know, my hands 
had deteriorated to that point. It had been two months 
and there hadn't been anything done except looking at 
them. 
Q. At the time you went into the hospital on the 
morning of July 9th, 1987, did you feel that there was 
anyone at fault for the problems with your arms? 
A. Yes, but I didn't know who. 
Q. You felt that somebody had done something wrong? 
A. Sure. I .indicated that to Dr. Beck in that 
conversation that I had with him, too. I think my — my 
words to him were: "If the surgery comes out okay, I'm 
happy." I told him, I says, "I don't want no cheese. I 
just want out of the trap." I told him: "If I have 
permanent damage, that's another case — " and I think 
that's probably what maybe put him on guard that he 
better stick his name on the release, too. 
Q. So as I understand it, your feeling was, is that 
you wanted the surgery; and if the surgery was 
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successful, the July surgery was successful, you weren't 
going to make any claim against anyone; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. You understood that the hospital would waive its 
fee or its charges. Did you expect to give anything to 
the hospital in exchange for that? 
A. I didn't know whether they were going to do it 
or not. He said he would mention it. 
Q. Did Clara Bates, or whomever brought that 
release up — did she tell you that the hospital would 
waive its fee? 
A. It says in the — in the paper that she gave me. 
Q. But she also told you that? 
A. I don't know. I guess. 
Q. And so as you understood it — as you're in the 
room and after she brought the release up, you understood 
that you would sign the release and the hospital would 
waive its fee or charges, and Dr. Beck would allow you to 
make payments for his charges, as he said, chip away at 
them? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you understood that that was the position of 
the hospital and the position of Dr. Beck? 
A. I didn't know prior to this release that the 
hospital was going to demand a release. 
8 
1 Q. Okay. But I want to talk about that window of 
2 time when the release is in the room with you, Clara 
3 Bates, your mother and Sarah McCarthy. You knew at the 
4 time that Beck was going — what he was going to do was 
5 perform the operation, but allow you to make payments on 
6 his fee and the hospital would waive its fee if you would 
7 J sign the release? 
A. I guess that's what it says here. Let me read 
9 this again. (pause.) 
10 I guess the part that upset me more than 
11 anything was he had included himself after we had made a 
12 deal, or he would do the surgery and I would make 
13 payments. 
14
 Q. Okay. But you understood before you signed the 
15 release what everyone's position was; you understood what 
16 the hospital wanted, the hospital wanted a release and 
17 they would waive their fee; you knew that? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. You knew that Dr. Beck would do the surgery and 
20 allow you to make payments for his fee? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. And you knew to get both of these commitments, 
23 one from the hospital and another commitment from Dr. 
24 Beck, that you had to sign the release? 
25 A. I knew that I had to sign the release to get the 
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1 surgery done. That was my prime concern. 
2 Q. By Dr. Beck? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. On that day? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. So you selected — knowing Dr. Beck's position 
7 and knowing the hospital's position, your choice was to 
8 sign the release and have the surgery done on those 
9 conditions on that day? 
10 A. (Pause.) 
u\ Q. Yes? 
12 A. T h a t ' s a ques t ion? 
13 Q. Y e s . 
14 \ A. I knew that if I signed it, they would do the 
15 surgery. 
16 Q. You knew that if you signed the release, you 
17 were releasing Dr. Beck and the hospital? 
18 A. I guess I did. 
19 Q. Well, you new that, didn't you? 
20 A. Yes. I didn't like it, didn't want to; but they 
21 had me in a trap and I had to do it. 
22 Q. And this trap that you're talking about is, is 
23 that you were kind of in your life at a fork in the road 
24 and you had two choices that you could have made: You 
25 could have had your mother and Sarah McCarthy take you 
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1 out of the room, go back down to the vehicle in which you 
2 came to the hospital and go back to your home and find 
3 another hospital and find another doctor; that was a 
4 choice that was open to you? 
5 A. I guess so, 
6 Q. And the other choice to you was to sign the 
7 release and then go forward with the surgery, with the 
8
 understanding that the hospital would waive its fee, Dr. 
9 Beck would allow you to make payments on the fee in 
JO exchange for the release; is that right? 
u \ A- You lost me on Dr. Beck's. 
12 Q. Dr. Beck would do the surgery and allow you to 
13 make payments on the fee? 
14
 A. That was the agreement I had with him before 
15 this showed up. 
16 Q. And after this showed up — referring to 
17 Exhibit 1 — you entered into a new agreement with him 
18 whereby you would have the surgery done by Dr. Beck, you 
19 would release Dr. Beck and Dr. Beck would allow you to 
20 make payments on this surgical fee; is that correct? 
21 A. You're losing me on the surgical-fee part. 
22 Q. He was going to let you make payments? 
23 \ A. You mean — it sounds like something he would 
24 do. He wants the release and the money; is that what 
25 you're saying? 
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1 Q. Did there come a time which you felt you wanted 
2 to bring a lawsuit against either the hospital or Dr. 
3 Beck or Dr. Hultgren? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. When did you decide that you thought you should 
6 sue any one of the three I just mentioned? 
7 I A. After I had gave them enough time for the — the 
8 percentages of the recoveries that Dr. Beck led me to 
9 believe would happen if I had the surgery, like 50 
10 percent in two-three weeks and possibly the other 50 
•II- percent within two-three months, I mean, I even gave it 
12 to — beyond that. Dr. Nord told me that they — that 
13 nerves regenerated one millimeter a day and were looking 
14 at possibly 18 inches. So he said maybe a year and a 
15 half, so I waited like damn near until the last minute to 
16 give it as much time as I could. 
17 Q. Did you ever tell Dr. Nord after the surgery 
IS anything about the release? 
19 A. No. 
20 Q. Did you discuss the release at all with Dr. 
21 Beck again, or did you just discuss your condition? 
22 A. No. We never — never anything — he was just 
23 kind of cool and distant toward me, and I was kind of 
24 cool and distant toward him. 
25 Q . What's your condition presently? 
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Tab 2 
RELEASE FROM LIABILITY 
AND 
RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS 
I, EUGENE R. ANDKEINI, will receive surgery to correct ulnar nerve 
palsy at approximately 10:00 a.m., July 9, 1987, with Holy Cross Hospital 
of Salt Lake City, Utah and David Beck, M.D., bearing all costs for this 
procedure as payment of services. 
I recognize this arrangement, made to me, as total compensation for 
the alleged accidental incident occurring during total knee joint 
replacement on May 5, 1987, does not constitute an acknowledgment of 
responsibility by Holy Cross Hospital of Salt Lake City for said 
accidental incident, and do hereby release, acquit, and forswear any 
claim, by me or on my behalf, against Holy Cross Hospital of Salt Lake 
City, and David Beck, M.D. for liability and damages which have occurred 
or may occur arising from said accidental incident. 
Signature: l^L^ \[ { A 
D a t e : 
EUGpNETt. ANDREINI . W i t n e s s 
^ r, 11*7 
